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International trade is traditionally thought
to consist of each country exporting the goods
most suited to its factor endowment, technol-
ogy, and climate while importing the goods
least suited for its national characteristics. Such
trade is called inter-industry trade because
countries export and import the products of dif-
ferent industries. But the top exports and
imports of most industrial countries are actually
similar items, such as passenger cars, electrical
generators, or valves and transistors. Indeed,
passenger cars are the number one export and
import of Great Britain, Germany, and France.
In the real world, international trade is largely
trade within broad industrial classifications.
Intra-industry trade occurs when a country
exports and imports goods in the same industry.
Intra-industry trade has been a hot topic among
trade economists for several decades, but it 
has received scant attention among economists
in general.
1 This article gives an overview of
intra-industry trade for the generalist. In the
debate over NAFTA, for example, commentators
focused much attention on America’s inter-
industry trade with Mexico but none on the far
more important intra-industry trade.
This article begins with a brief summary of
Ricardian and factor endowment approaches to
trade theory to highlight the contribution of intra-
industry trade theory. Next, the article discusses
the foundations of intra-industry trade theory
and the significance of intra-industry trade for 
an economy. Finally, the U.S.–Mexico trade rela-
tionship is addressed as a pertinent example.
STANDARD TRADE THEORY
To understand why trade economists have
turned their attention to intra-industry trade, it is
necessary to understand the implications of
inter-industry trade. Standard trade theory in-
volves trade in homogeneous products; hence,
with perfect competition there is only inter-
industry trade. David Ricardo (1817) introduced
standard trade theory when he formulated what
we now call the theory of comparative advan-
tage. Ricardo highlighted the key ingredient of
the theory: goods are more mobile across inter-
national boundaries than are resources (land,
labor, and capital). This assumption still charac-
terizes the theory of intra-industry trade. The
theory of comparative advantage deals with all
those causes of international trade that are 
generated by the differences among countries.
Ricardo’s contribution was not simply that he
noted countries are different but that he showed
how those differences resulted in all countries





industries rather than between
industries. Such trade is more
beneficial than inter-industry
trade because it stimulates
innovation and exploits
economies of scale.
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being internationally competitive even though
they might have higher wages (for advanced
countries) or lower productivity (for developing
countries) than their neighbors.
Ricardo’s own subtle explanation is
couched in terms of the barter of exports for
imports. In the practical world, trade is con-
ducted in terms of prices: people buy homoge-
neous goods where they are the cheapest.
Consider a world of two countries, called home
and foreign. The two homogeneous goods are
apples and bananas. Suppose in the home
country apples cost $1 each and bananas cost
$2 each, and in the foreign country bananas
cost $1 and apples cost $2. For simplicity, the
two countries are mirror images. Keeping with
the simple theme, but without any sacrifice of
insight, imagine everyone in the world spends
exactly one-half his or her income on each good.
Suppose each country has income of $100.
Thus, before trade, the home (foreign) country
consumes fifty apples (bananas) and twenty-five
bananas (apples). If trade is opened between
the countries and there are zero transport costs
and tariffs, people will buy the homogeneous
products in the country where they are the
cheapest. Thus, with free trade between the two
countries, the home country will buy bananas
from the foreign country, and the foreign coun-
try will buy apples from the home country. The
price of each product in a competitive world
will be the price in the lowest cost country.
Thus, without tariffs or transport costs, the
prices of apples and bananas will both be $1 in
a world of perfect competition.
Clearly, both countries gain from trade.
This gain can be quantified. The price of the
imported good (bananas for the home country,
apples for the foreign country) drops by 50 per-
cent (from $2 to $1); since half of all income is
devoted to each good, the real cost of living
falls by approximately 25 percent. With an in-
come of $100, each country now consumes fifty
units of each good, including twenty-five units
more of the imported good.
This example has been deliberately con-
ducted without reference to wages and produc-
tivity, but that is in the background. The same
example is consistent with widely different pro-
ductivities.
2 Suppose that in the home country
each worker can produce two apples or one
banana. If prior to trade the price of apples is $1
and bananas $2, a worker can earn $2 in either
industry. Suppose that in the foreign country
each worker can produce ten apples or twenty
bananas. Thus, the foreign country is five times
more efficient in apples and twenty times more
efficient in bananas than the home country. If
once again, prior to trade, in the foreign coun-
try, bananas are $1 and apples $2 (the reverse),
a worker can earn $20 in either apple or banana
production. When trade is opened, apples and
bananas are again $1 (as in the first example),
but wages are ten times higher in the foreign
country than in the home country. Since apples
and bananas both sell for $1, in the home coun-
try no one wants to work in banana production,
and in the foreign country no one wants to
work in apple production.
Trade causes a massive relocation from
industries that compete with imports to export
industries. In this simple example, wages are
not hurt because of the simplicity of the model:
there are no learning costs, and workers are
homogeneous and can easily switch from, say,
apple production to banana production. Trade
has no downside.
The Ricardian model of trade is designed
to show that every country can profitably take
advantage of any differences among countries.
Whether one country has higher wages or lower
productivity, the competitive wage rates that
prevail in a country ensure that every country
will specialize in the good in which it has a
comparative advantage. In our example, the
home country exports apples, the good in
which its disadvantage is the smallest; and the
foreign country exports bananas, the good in
which its advantage is the largest.
The Ricardian trade model cannot explain
how trade impacts the income distribution
within a country or what determines com-
parative advantage. For these, trade theorists
turn to the Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade
(Samuelson 1948).
The Heckscher–Ohlin model (developed
by Swedish economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil
Ohlin) describes a world in which every country
faces the same technological frontiers and has
productive factors with the same qualities. The
only difference between countries is in terms of
the physical quantities of the factors of produc-
tion, so that the Heckscher–Ohlin model is an
account of trade based on factor endowments.
This theory has three fundamental fea-
tures. First, each country exports goods that are
intensive in the country’s relatively abundant
factors. Using Ricardian insights, we could ex-
press this as well by saying a country exports
those goods in which its abundant factors have
a comparative advantage. Thus, the United
States is richly endowed with high-technology
skills and farmland, so it is not surprising that
we export high-tech products and agriculturalFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 4
goods. Our number one export is aircraft, which
requires a great deal of technological expertise.
Countries like Argentina and Australia, which
are rich in land, are big exporters of beef and
wool.
The second feature is that trade based on
factor endowments benefits abundant factors
and hurts scarce factors. When the United States
exports wheat, the owners of wheat land bene-
fit; but when the United States imports textiles,
the unskilled workers in the textile industry are
hurt. This is all a question of pricing. If the price
of anything rises or falls, those productive fac-
tors with a comparative advantage in that 
product find their incomes rising or falling,
respectively. (See the box entitled “The Stolper–
Samuelson Theorem.”)
The last feature of the Heckscher–Ohlin
model is that international trade results in a ten-
dency toward factor price equalization. This can
be explained with a slight modification of the
Ricardian example. Suppose the world has 
two types of workers, type A and type B. Type
A workers can produce two apples or one
banana, and type B workers can produce four
bananas or two apples. It is clear that type A
workers will produce apples and type B work-
ers, bananas. Now suppose all countries are the
same except that they have different numbers of
type A and type B workers. When trade is estab-
lished between two countries, apples and
bananas will sell for, say, $1 each. Then type A
workers, regardless of their location, will pro-
duce apples and earn $2; type B workers,
regardless of their location, will produce
bananas and earn $4. The identical production
conditions around the world guarantee the
same wages for A people or B people as long
as apples and bananas fetch the same price.
Countries will export apples or bananas, de-
pending on whether they have relatively more
A people or B people.
3
In the Heckscher–Ohlin model, economies
export the services of their abundant factors and
import the services of their scarce factors. But
empirical investigations of the Heckscher–Ohlin
model have not had much success (Trefler
1995). In particular, it has been found that the
estimated trade in factor services is less than the
actual factor endowments around the world
would predict (Trefler 1995, 1032).
If this is the case, we should not expect
international trade to have much of an impact
on income distribution. The Heckscher–Ohlin
model suggests that since labor is the scarce 
factor in the United States, international trade
should hurt labor and help capital. Table 1 pre-
sents statistics on trade and income distribution
in the United States from 1972 to 1997. During
this period the ratio of imports to GDP doubles
from 6 percent to 13 percent. Yet the ratio of
wages to national income falls insignificantly
from 73 percent in 1972 to 71 percent in 1997.
While this reduction may be disturbing to some,
we must remember that during this period 
transfer payments to individuals increase sub-
stantially, from 12.4 percent to 16.3 percent of
personal income (Executive Office of the Presi-
dent 1999, 360–61). This could account for a
slight reduction in the importance of wages.
However, it can be argued that international
trade should help skilled workers and hurt
unskilled workers since unskilled workers are
the scarce factor in the United States. The average
wage data do not capture this. During the same
period the overall level of income inequality 
in the United States rises. The Gini coefficient 
(1 = perfect inequality; 0 = perfect equality)
climbs from .401 in 1972 to .459 in 1997.
4 This
change is largely due to the rising ratio of
skilled to unskilled wages, which reflects not so
much trends in international trade but trends
toward technology that favors skilled workers
(Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993). Note that from
1972 to 1977, the importance of trade to the 
U.S. economy jumps dramatically with virtually
no change in the Gini coefficient. The major
changes in the Gini coefficient occur with small
or no changes in the amount of trade. Thus, it
is difficult to conclude that international trade
has had an unfavorable impact on income dis-
tribution in the United States.
A major reason international trade does
not have the predicted impact on income distri-
The Stolper–Samuelson Theorem
One of the classic theorems in international trade theory is the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem, named after Wolfgang Stolper and Nobel prize winner Paul
Samuelson (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).The theorem is celebrated because it
indicates that an increase in the price of labor-intensive goods raises the real return
to labor independently of all considerations of how labor spends it income.The key is
this: if the price of labor-intensive goods rises, resources will be drawn out of other
industries into the labor-intensive industries. But the other industries are not labor-
intensive; they may be land-intensive. If this is the case, then, relative to demand,
labor becomes more scarce and land less scarce, driving up the price of labor and
driving down the price of land. Moreover, for every 1 percent increase in the price of
the labor-intensive good, the price of labor rises by more than 1 percent.The reason
is simple: the cost of the product is made up of both land and labor. If land falls in
price and labor rises in price, the wage rate must rise by more than the price of the
labor-intensive good. Suppose labor is 75 percent of total costs. If the price of the
labor-intensive good rises by 10 percent, the price of labor must rise by more than
10 percent to increase total costs by 10 percent.
The implication of Stolper–Samuelson is that if a country imports labor-intensive
goods, international trade lowers the price of such goods and so makes laborers
worse off. While the economy as a whole gains, workers lose out. If a country
exports labor-intensive goods, both the economy as a whole and workers gain from
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bution is that most international trade is intra-
industry. When international trade takes place,
there is not a massive reallocation of factors of
production from labor-intensive industries to
capital-intensive industries. Instead, factors of
production are reallocated within industries,
and this does not have the same impact as inter-
industry trade.
FOUNDATIONS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
The above description of the basic causes
of inter-industry trade focuses on the differences
between countries. But a great deal of interna-
tional trade can take place between similar
countries. Consider two countries that produce
watches and radios. Let the products be homo-
geneous and the countries identical. But assume
economies of scale so that production costs fall
with greater output. Clearly, it would be benefi-
cial if one country produced watches and the
other produced radios. But this is still not intra-
industry trade. A simple example involves trans-
portation costs, or what is called border trade,
where two countries share a border but some
towns are best served by a nearer plant in the
adjacent country because of transport costs.
Now modify the economies of scale discussion.
Let watches be differentiated. Wouldn’t there be
specialization within the category of watches,
with one country producing more sports watches
and another more luxury watches? Larger mar-
kets open up more possibilities of producing a
larger number of varieties (think of the tremen-
dous variety of passenger cars existing in the
world today).
A monopolistically competitive industry is
one that produces the same generic good.
However, each firm occupies a particular posi-
tion or niche by virtue of product differentiation
(quality, location, color, size, and so on). There
is free entry of new firms selling differentiated
products, and the seller of each variety has some
control over price. The automobile industry may
be thought of as a prototypical monopolistically
competitive industry. The number of products
produced in the industry may be supposed to
be equal to the number of abstract firms, al-
though several of such firms may belong to the
same conglomeration, such as Ford or General
Motors. There may not be free entry for the con-
glomerates, but there certainly is for the niches
they choose. It is relatively easy for any of the
large automobile companies to produce a par-
ticular type of sport utility vehicle, for example.
Think of an industry as consisting of
“resources” that must be allocated among differ-
ent versions of the same generic product.
5 For
simplicity, identify a firm with producing a par-
ticular variety. On the average, the number of
varieties must be equal to the resources devoted
to the industry divided by the average resources
used by a typical firm. This is our first principle.
The second principle is that the resources
used by the firm (each product) equal fixed
costs plus variable costs. Fixed costs (F ) do not
vary with output (x), and variable costs vary
with output. We suppose variable costs are pro-
portional to output by the constant c. Thus, the
resources used by the firm are represented by 
F + cx. The quantity c is incremental or marginal
cost. If the total resources devoted to an indus-
try are denoted by R, the first principle implies
that the number of products, n, is
(1) n = R/(F + cx).
The third principle is that every firm in the
industry exercises some monopoly power and
so can charge a price above incremental or mar-
ginal cost. We simplify by supposing each firm
has the same marginal cost and charges the
same markup over cost. Thus, the price (P),
where k is the price markup (>1) is
(2) P = kc.
The fourth principle is that firms enter the
industry as long as there are economic profits;
that is, the price of the product exceeds the
average (opportunity) cost of producing the
good. The average cost of the good is F/x + c,
so entry occurs until the price equals average
cost:
(3) P = F/x + c.
If we put Equations 2 and 3 together, we can
solve for x since kc = F/x + c:
(4) x = F/c(k – 1).
We can substitute Equation 4 into Equation 1 to
solve for the number of products:
(5) n = R (k – 1)/Fk.
Table 1
Trade and Income Distribution
Year Imports/GDP Wages/National Income Gini Coefficient
1997 .13 .71 .459
1992 .11 .73 .451
1987 .11 .72 .426
1982 .09 .74 .412
1977 .09 .72 .402
1972 .06 .73 .401
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The number of products in an industry rises as
resources devoted to industry rise, pricing
power (k) falls, or fixed costs fall.
Since the price of every good in this sim-
plified case is the same, we can measure the
total output of the industry as simply nx. Thus,
(6) Q = nx = R/ck.
Equation 6 is very interesting because it shows
that fixed costs do not affect total output, only
the number of products. Thus, lowering fixed
costs keeps output the same but spreads the
output over a greater number of products, thus
allowing more customization.
Now imagine we have two industries, one
with resources R1 and the other with resources
R2. Measure total resources in the economy as
1. We want to relate all this to international
trade between two countries, the home and 
foreign (denoted by an asterisk). In the home
country,  R1 = 1 – z and  R2 =  z. The foreign
country is precisely the opposite, where R* 1 = z
and R* 2 = 1 – z. It follows from Equation 6 that
(7) Q1/Q* 1 = (1 – z)/z and Q2/Q* 2 = z/(1 – z).
In other words, the relative size of an
industry across countries exactly reflects the
relative amounts of industry resources across
countries. This rather trivial fact follows from
the assumptions that preferences are uniformly
spread over all equally costly products selling at
the same price.
The world resources devoted to each in-
dustry also equal 1. Moreover, each country may
be thought of as having income of 1. To make
things even simpler, suppose each country
spends exactly half its income on the products
of each industry. Since the proportion z of in-
dustry 1 is produced in the foreign country and
the proportion 1 – z in the home country and
these are all different varieties of the same good,
the home country is importing (1/2)z of indus-
try 1 products from the foreign country while
the foreign country is importing (1/2)(1 – z) of
industry 1 products from the home country. The
home country is simultaneously exporting
(1/2)(1 – z) units of industry 1 products and
importing (1/2)z units of industry 1 products.
The same holds for industry 2 products. If z =
1/2, so the two countries are identical, all trade
is intra-industry, and each country’s exports and
imports of each good are the same. If z < 1/2,
the home country has more resources devoted
to industry 1 than industry 2.
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The closer z is to one-half, the more intra-
industry trade there is; the closer z is to 0 or 1,
the less intra-industry trade there is. When z =
1/2, both countries have the same endowments
of resources, and all trade is intra-industry.
When z is not equal to one-half, the two coun-
tries are different and some trade is inter-indus-
try. We may measure the intra-industry trade
(IIT) in industry 1 products by home exports
minus home imports:
(8) IIT1 = (1/2)(1 – z) – (1/2)z = (1/2)(1 – 2z).
Clearly, if z < 1/2, the home country exports
more industry 1 products than it imports. Its
intra-industry trade in industry 2 products will
be the opposite: it will import more than it ex-
ports. Thus, net exports of industry 1 are paying
for net imports of industry 2. This is inter-indus-
try trade.
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
In 1996, 57 percent of U.S. trade took
place within rather than between four-digit
Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) industries (Executive Office of the Presi-
dent 1998, 218). Intra-industry trade constitutes
more than 60 percent of European trade and
about 20 percent of Japanese trade. The pre-
ceding theory tells us Japan has less intra-
industry trade because its factor endowment is
significantly different from those of other
advanced countries; another reason is Japan
does not experience much border trade. More-
over, the ratio of population to land area is
about 365 people per square kilometer, com-
pared with, for example, 108 for France. Thus,
it is not surprising that Japan imports more raw
materials than do most other developed coun-
tries. With more raw materials, there are fewer
differentiated manufactured products and less
intra-industry trade.
The significance of intra-industry trade
arises from its basic character: it need not be
based on comparative advantage. To a large
extent intra-industry trade arises from the facts
that products are differentiated and the produc-
tion of any particular product requires some
fixed costs. Thus, the more sport utility vehicles
Ford makes, the lower the unit cost; the more
Mercedes-Benz convertibles produced, the lower
the unit cost. Some elements of comparative ad-
vantage may be involved; for example, Germany
may have a comparative advantage in produc-
ing high-quality cars. However, the automobile
industry is now a world industry (mergers be-
tween Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, Ford and
Volvo, and so forth). To the extent that compar-
ative advantage is not involved, the pattern of
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are involved, who exports what can be deter-
mined by the accident of history.
One of the great benefits of intra-industry
trade is that international trade need not cause
the dislocations associated with inter-industry
trade. The Stolper–Samuelson theorem (see box)
suggests that international trade can cause a
redistribution of income from scarce factors to
abundant factors. But if most international trade
is intra-industry, the impact on internal income
distribution should be relatively minor. If trade
is not based on scarce and abundant factors of
production, it does not result in reduced de-
mand for the scarce factors and increased de-
mand for the abundant factors; thus, trade ex-
pansion need not result in large changes in the
distribution of income. As pointed out earlier
(Table 1), trade does not appear to have nega-
tive consequences for income distribution in the
United States.
Intra-industry trade enhances the gains
from trade through better exploitation of econo-
mies of scale—rather than through comparative
advantage—as trade leads countries to concen-
trate on a limited number of products within
any particular industry. This leads to an expan-
sion of world output because of the saving of
fixed costs.
Specialization within industrial categories
may also stimulate innovation. Producing a
greater variety and number of goods increases
our general knowledge about technology, and
greater knowledge implies smaller costs of
knowledge accumulation. For example, U.S.
importation of Japanese cars and trucks has led
to improvements in U.S. car and truck manufac-
turers. Adam Smith pointed out that the division
of labor itself promoted innovation:
The invention of all those machines
by which labour is so much facilitated and
abridged seems to have been originally
owing to the division of labour. Men are
much more likely to discover easier and
readier methods of attaining any object
when the whole attention of their minds is
directed towards that single object than
when it is dissipated among a great variety
of things. But in consequence of the divi-
sion of labour, the whole of every man’s
attention comes naturally to be directed
towards some one very simple object.
(Smith 1937, Book I, Chapter 1).
Substantial evidence suggests international
trade is more beneficial than the standard the-
ory of inter-industry trade implies. According to
standard theory, opening international trade
causes an increase in the level of GDP but no
long-run increase in the rate of economic
growth. When we classify countries according
to their degrees of protectionism, economies
with open trade regimes appear to grow their
per capita incomes from 1 percent to 2 percent
faster  per year (Gould and Ruffin 1995). This
can be explained by the theory of endogenous
growth: trade stimulates innovation, and inno-
vation begets more innovation (Gould and
Ruffin 1993).
Finally, intra-industry trade reduces the
demands for protection because in any industry
there are both exports and imports, making it
difficult to achieve unanimity among those
demanding protection (Marvel and Ray 1987).
Intra-industry trade need not give rise to a
justification for a strategic trade policy, that is,
giving export subsidies to correct for departures
from perfect competition. It is true that much
intra-industry trade takes place under imperfect
competition, but monopolistic competition is for
all practical purposes efficient. Indeed, it is easy
to construct examples in which monopolistic
competition provides optimal product diversity
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Two basic, necessary
—but not sufficient—conditions for a strategic
trade policy are (1) foreign monopoly or oli-
gopoly and the ability to shift foreign profits 
to domestic residents and (2) externalities, in
which the promotion of certain industries bene-
fits others in a way that cannot be captured by
private markets.
7 However, these are not key
parts of the intra-industry story.
U.S. TRADE WITH MEXICO
Contrary to popular belief, the top U.S.
imports from Mexico are not clothing, fruits, and
vegetables. These represent only 10 percent of
U.S. imports. Table 2 lists the top seven exports
and imports to and from Mexico for 1998.
Electrical machinery and equipment (and
related parts) ranks first, representing 27 per-
cent of U.S. imports from Mexico. Vehicles rank
second, and nuclear reactors, boilers, and
related items are third.
Interestingly, the United States’ top three
exports to Mexico are these same three cate-
gories. However, only 48 percent of U.S.
exports to Mexico consist of these big, capital-
intensive items, compared with 57 percent for
imports from Mexico. Not only are Mexico’s
exports to the United States quite similar to its
imports (intra-industry trade), but Mexico’s ex-
ports are more concentrated in those big items
of intra-industry trade.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 8
The products listed in Table 2 represent 61
percent of all exports and 74 percent of all
imports in U.S. trade with Mexico. Of these
imports and exports, about 80 percent represent
intra-industry trade—perhaps the most impor-
tant point regarding U.S.–Mexico trade. The
United States exports automobile parts to
Mexico, where the cars are assembled, and
some are shipped back. But the flow of auto-
mobile parts is actually heavier from Mexico
into the United States. Indeed, vehicle parts
account for only about 6 percent of U.S. exports
to Mexico, whereas they make up 20 percent of
U.S. imports from Mexico. These parts are
assembled in the United States, and the vehicles
are shipped back to Mexico.
Much U.S. trade with Mexico involves the
maquiladora industries along the U.S.–Mexican
border. The maquiladora (“twin plant or pro-
duction sharing”) program has opened the
2,000-mile border region into a rapidly de-
veloping industrial zone for American firms 
involved in labor-intensive manufacturing.
Under the program, equipment, machinery,
supplies, and raw materials can be temporarily
imported into Mexico duty-free. Products are
assembled and/or manufactured using inexpen-
sive Mexican labor and exported back to the
United States, where duty is paid only on 
the “Mexican value-added,” or shipped to other 
foreign countries. Such trade may appear to
reduce the demand for labor by U.S. industries.
But molded plastics, packaging material, elec-
tronic components, and wire constitute a large
part of the materials purchased by the
maquiladoras. If they were purchasing the prod-
ucts of capital-intensive industries, the effect
might be to reduce U.S. labor demand. But the
maquiladoras are buying and selling labor-
intensive products. Thus, U.S. trade with Mexico
does not fit into a neat scarce-factor/abundant-
factor explanation of trade.
CONCLUSIONS
Intra-industry trade represents interna-
tional trade within industries rather than be-
tween industries. Such trade is more beneficial
than inter-industry trade because it stimulates
innovation and exploits economies of scale.
Moreover, since productive factors do not switch
from one industry to another, but only within
industries, intra-industry trade is less disruptive
than inter-industry trade. About 60 percent of
U.S. trade or European trade is intra-industry.
By comparison, about 80 percent of U.S. trade
with Mexico is intra-industry, and thus concern
that trade with Mexico will harm unskilled
workers is based on an erroneous view of the
nature of that trade.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank David Gould for comments.
The author is responsible for all errors and omissions.
1 The classic treatise is Grubel and Lloyd (1975).
2 As Ricardo put it: “The labour of 100 Englishmen can-
not be given for that of 80 Englishmen, but the pro-
duce of the labour of 100 Englishmen may be given
for the produce of the labour of 80 Portuguese, 60
Russians, or 120 East Indians.”
3 The setup in this paragraph follows Ruffin (1988).
4 The Gini coefficient is calculated from the Lorenz
curve and is approximately the proportion by which
the distribution of income differs from perfect equality.
5 The theory that follows is a simplified version of a
paper by Krugman (1981), which is in turn an exten-
sion and simplification of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
6 This argument is in Dixit and Norman (1980) and
Krugman (1981).
7 For a wide-ranging collection of articles, see Krugman
(1986).
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